

***Rethinking Sociology:***  
**Self, Knowledge, Practice, and Dialectics in Transitions to  
Quantum Social Science**

**M. H. (Behrooz) Tamdgidi**

*University of Massachusetts Boston*

---

**I. INTRODUCTION**

I remember back in high school in Iran, in a physics class one day, our teacher was dictating a problem for us to solve. Exact details of the problem escapes me now, but it went something like this: "A light bulb is hanging from the ceiling of a room. A ray of light leaves the bulb and is reflected by a mirror on the floor directly below it, hitting the ceiling directly above the bulb causing a certain heat. Calculate the temperature of the heat generated on the ceiling after a certain time has elapsed after its being turned on." As the teacher went on to provide more details and directions, I raised my hand and said, "May I Sir?" He said "What?" I said, "Sir, there is a problem with your problem?" He replied reluctantly, "What is it?" I said, "Well, Sir, the reflected ray of light can't reach the ceiling, because

the bulb is in its way." His frown turning into a smile, and shaking his head, he thoughtfully paused for a minute and then proceeded to change the terms of the problem.

Somehow today, writing this paper for the 2004 ESS Conference on "Rethinking Careers in A Changing Society," in a panel dealing with postmodern rethinking of the sociology of knowledge, and reflectively having the light bulb "rethinking sociology" hanging over my head as the title of my paper, I am struck by a similar "problem with the problem." "May I Sir? How can we rethink sociology when our existing sociological thoughts are in the way?" "How can we rethink sociological careers, Sir, when our existing sociological careers are in (or even on) the line?"

The more radical our rethinking, it seems, the more our efforts appear to be exercises in (disciplinary or even career) "self-destructive behaviors," so to speak. Parenthetically, note here that in both of the latter questions what lends to their paradoxical nature is a common underlying subconscious assumption that the agency who

---

1. Presented to the 74th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society New York City, February 19-22, 2004 (Panel: "A Postmodern Rethinking of Sociology of Knowledge"). Author contact information: mohammad.tamdgidi@umb.edu

thinks in the existing way is the same agency that seeks to rethink the subject matter in other ways—hence the paradox. In other words, if we had considered the rethinking agency to be embodied in a separate person/body than in the one thinking in existing ways—if we had thought of the behavior in terms of *destructive interpersonal* rather than in terms of *self-destructive, intrapersonal*, parameters—their juxtaposition would not have seemed paradoxical. Being destructive to others does not seem to be as paradoxical as being destructive to oneself. To this issue I will return later as it provides a key to understanding the problem in terms of our existing habituated modes of modern sociological thinking about the problem, and to suggesting ways of rethinking them in postmodern ways—qualifying in the meantime whatever the latter means.

Of course, this brings us directly to the subdisciplinary field traditionally known as “the sociology of knowledge,” one dealing with the study of the relationship between social existence and thought—itsself a scientific variant of a broader and much older philosophical, or even perhaps religious, inquiry into the nature of the relationship between matter and mind. It seems to me that—as Siamak Movahedi, the organizer of this panel, rightly foresaw—all papers presented in this panel<sup>1</sup> deal one way or another with the sociology of knowledge and ways of rethinking it in new ways. Jorge Capetillo, for instance, uses the Simmelian sociology of social forms and contents to better understand and appreciate Octavio Paz’s seemingly “chaotic” literary symbolisms in his *The Labyrinth of Solitude*; his aim is to highlight Paz’s worth as a sociologist—more so, as a sociologist of knowledge—who makes

highly creative efforts in the pursuit of personal, national, and global self-knowledge to understand his identity in relationship to an expanding circle of social existences—as Octavio Paz, as a Mexican, and as a member of the human family. What makes Paz’s sociology of knowledge new, perhaps, is that his knowledge does not seem to be simply reflective, but actually generative of new social identities for himself, for Mexico, and the global humanity—for which, of course, he won a Nobel Prize.

Similarly, Michal Ginach’s paper explores the relationship between Israel’s collective conscious and unconscious knowledges of and policies towards terrorism on one hand, and on the other, the political and cultural historical contexts from which they arise—questioning whether Israel’s policies are more generative than alleviative of terrorism. Again, this seems to be an approach to the sociology of knowledge which innovatively runs contrary to the traditional “social origins of knowledge” framework. Robin Gomolin’s paper, moreover, deals with the relationship between the biohistorical experiences of recovering Holocaust survivors and their children and the knowledges produced in the political and academic circles about them—asking whether their cross-generational social behaviors inherit psychopathological patterns, or, conversely, the academic and political considerations extrinsically superimposed a mental illness diagnosis on what no longer existed as such. Again, this seems to be a logical argumentation problematizing the traditional sociology of knowledge model. Comparatively, it seems to me that Ginach and Gomolin’s efforts, interestingly, can be similarly interpreted as Pazian efforts in understanding what it means to be Jewish/Israeli in the chaotic regional and wider global contexts of the post-WWII period—Gomolin’s paper retrospectively interrogating the self-knowledges of Israelis as victims of the Holocaust, while Ginach’s

---

1. *Editor’s Note:* These papers, by Michal Ginach, Robin Gomolin, and Jorge Capetillo-Ponce, are included in this issue of *The Discourse of Sociological Practice*.

approach problematizing Israeli victimization of others, particularly the Palestinians, and thereby, reflectively, of themselves.

Movahedi and I may perhaps undertake similar Pazian inquiries into our personal, national, or even global self-knowledge in the Iranian-American context, wondering what may also lend to our prides in and/or discomforts with being identified with a particular cultural and national tradition. Why should our self-identifications as Iranians, or our expressions of what may be seen by others as our extra-academic heritages and talents, be consciously or unconsciously interpreted as real or imagined exercises in self-destructive behaviors? However, borrowing from Movahedi's interest in the study of the nature of the relationship between self-destructive behaviors and wider social structures—itself a sociology of knowledge line of inquiry—I believe one may rethink all the above-mentioned papers in terms of (in the case of Gomolin and Ginach) what appear to be the study of self-destructive historical interpretations of and political attitudes towards the Jewish/Israeli postwar experience, and (in the case of Capetillo's work on Paz) what seems to be a particularly successful and creative literary exercise in overcoming self-destructive Aztecian and colonial tendencies inherited from the past in the Mexican context. Methodologically, in fact, what seems to be common to them all is also what seems to be central to the purpose of this paper—namely, an exploratory exercise in overcoming self-destructive disciplinary/career tendencies cross-generationally passed on in modern sociological thoughts—or, rather, surprisingly we may discover, a conscious and intentional exercise on our part to creatively rethink the sociology of knowledge in post-modern ways.

Now, in the interest of relating to the works of all those on this panel, let me ask, How does Frank Nutch come into the pic-

ture? I think he already has—very much in-between the above lines, in terms of what he and Dick Butcher have called “Interactive Ethnography” (1999). The method involves collective and reflective participation with a research partner in a common field work in such a way that the representational goal of understanding the field “object” is deemed secondary and a means to the end of self-reflective study of what goes on in the cross- and inner dialogues of researchers as they prepare for, conduct, and evaluate their work. As Movahedi points out in his editorial note to the Butcher and Nutch piece (1999), what is novel is that the researching subject is treated as being a part of the whole that is the object of research—in fact, the researching subject is the primary object of research. I must add here parenthetically that I am not persuaded to see the contribution of the method in terms of its interpersonally “interactive” element, but in the strongly self-reflective nature of the agency that conducts research. In fact, it would be far more Meadian to argue that intra- and inter-personal reflection and interaction are as much identical and “twin-born” as they are both social and communicative endeavors. In fact, one of Nutch's subsequent reports, an account of his personal research interest and field work with marine biologists (2003), a sort of “research on research setting” (2003, 17)—where he, not in accompaniment of a research partner but by himself, participates in “observing scientists at work” (2003, 17), and creatively and intractively reflects on various issues having to do with his inner thoughts and his self-presentations to his scientific community—well illustrates that his method's value can be maintained as much in an “intra-active ethnographic” framework as in an “interactive ethnographic” arrangement in partnership with an “other” researcher. As this issue goes to the heart of my discussion and argument in this paper, I will not go into it any further in these introductory remarks.

However, I must add here that it is thanks to Nutch's contribution that I would like to propose, perhaps a novelty in-and-of-itself, viewing our own conference panel as an exercise in "inter/intra-active ethnography" during which our gaze is as much, if not more, on ourselves as research agents, as in the particular "objects" we seek to represent through our individual papers. It is for this purpose that I actually began this introduction with what Nutch would call a "pre-visitation" preparation for the panel, trying to initiate an inner dialogue in myself as to what others may be arguing (partly helped by the abstracts Movahedi kindly gathered), so as to more fruitfully visit this panel today not as a research reporting exercise, but as a research-conducting venue.

Rather than introducing another empirical example (say, that drawn from the Iranian experience), therefore, I would like in this paper to reflectively take up the theoretical and methodological issues the other papers raise with regards to the sociology of knowledge of self-destructive behaviors in broader social-structural contexts. The reason for this is not only to enrich the historical vs. theoretical dialecticity of our panel's inquiry, but also to interrogate more directly the "problem-with-the-problem" dilemma with which I began this paper—namely, to encourage a self-reflective effort on our part, while examining our empirical sites, to also explore the kinds of sociologies, and in particular sociologies of knowledge, we consciously and subconsciously use to inform and perform our empirical inquiries. In fact, the very useful framing by Movahedi of this panel's topic in terms of "postmodern rethinking" implies a typology of sociologies of knowledge which needs to be itself explicated and problematized while investigating our particular subject matters. Taking an inductive approach to the exposition of this paper, however, I will postpone my thoughts on that typology to my closing arguments.

## II. DE/RECONSTRUCTING THE MODERN SOCIOLOGIES OF KNOWLEDGE

For the sake of conceptual clarifications, let me begin by problematizing the central problem taken up by the modern sociologies of knowledge.

I have elsewhere explored in more detail the historical development of scholarly thought in the field, and appreciatively critiqued the particular Mannheimian definition of the field and its central problem (Tamdgidi, 1999, 2002). I have argued that from Mannheim, and despite the critiques of his approach which historically followed the publication of his *Ideology and Utopia* (1936), the sociology of knowledge has inherited not only an interest in the study of the relationship between knowledge and social existence, but an inclination to define the problem in terms of a particular mode of determination between the two as a dualistic conceptual structure, i.e., in terms of the study of "social origins of knowledge." This particular formulation has sedimented in our subconscious scholarly notions not only of the sociology of knowledge, but even of our sociologies in general, to such an extent that to partake in the sociology of knowledge has meant to partake in tracing various knowledges and ideologies to their "social origins" in terms often of class, status, and power interests.

For instance, when we are confronted with the curious fact that despite the existence of substantial studies indicating that Holocaust survivors actually did heal during their lifetimes from their Holocaust wounds, and managed to conduct what seems to be "normal" lives, we attribute the continuation of political and academic discourses in favor of the thesis of cross-generational continuation of mental illness and neurosis among the children of Holocaust survivors to certain underlying ideological-

political or even restitutive-financial interests. Another instance is tracing the terrorism-generative policies of the state of Israel to underlying conscious or subconscious cultural fantasies embodied in everyday political discourses of Israeli state policy makers—or, in the American context, exploring the nourishment of terrorism from the conscious or unconscious fantasies manufactured by the Hollywood ideological state apparatus.

Before further problematizing this Mannheimian “social origins of knowledge” model of practicing the sociology of knowledge as outlined above, we need of course to not lose sight of his particularly innovative contribution to the field. For Mannheim, ideological analyses turn into scientific exercises in the sociology of knowledge when we begin to realize that not only others’ but even our own thoughts are ideological, and thereby socially rooted in particular social interests. Therefore, to pursue a Mannheimian line of inquiry, we would be not only doing ideological analysis of the social origins of Jewish/Israeli attitudes towards Holocaust survivors or terrorism—or in the case of Capetillo, studying how Paz interprets and transforms the Mexican identity in the historical context of inherited Aztec culture and later colonial experience—but also would seek to be constantly aware of the ideological nature and social rootedness of our own thoughts on the subject. This Mannheimian emphasis, of course as noted earlier, is echoed in the self-reflective research attitude Nutch encourages us to adopt. That we, as Mexican-Americans, Jewish-Americans, Iranian-Americans—and academicians, one must add—hold particular ideological inclinations, and class/status interests which influence not only what problems we choose (or not choose) for our study, but how we go about exploring and resolving them.

The point here, by introducing what in

my view are the limitations and the contributions of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, namely its limited predeterministic formulation of the problem in terms of “the social origins of knowledge” and the positive self-reflexive recasting of the sociology of knowledge as analysis of ideological nature of not only others’ but also one’s own thoughts, is to interrogate the way in which “social structure,” “social existence,” or “social origins,” are themselves woven into the very fabric of our definitions and formulations of the sociology of knowledge. To clarify this point, let me introduce the symbolic language of diagrams.

In thinking about the traditional problem of the sociology of knowledge as outlined above, four binary sets of conceptions seem to guide our thinking: self-society, knowledge-reality, theory-practice, and dialectics-determinism. If we were to draw a diagram of these binaries in relationship to one another, perhaps a picture that may immediately emerge is the one illustrated in Figure 1 (next page). In this diagram, dialectical relationships are depicted by dual arrows pointing in opposite directions, while commonly held notions of determinism are depicted by heavy and light arrow lines; I use the term “predeterministic dialectics” to draw attention to our common scholarly notions in which both reciprocity and universal mode of causal determination (society shaping self, reality underlying knowledge, or practice determining theory) are accommodated. Figure 1 also depicts this predetermined-while-dialectical interactions in terms of the relationship between self and society, themselves together being characterized as the social reality or existence from which our knowledges arise and to which our practices return. In order to illustrate the ideological nature of the conceptual framework just diagrammed, let me also introduce a completely different rendering of the visual representation (see Figure 2, next page).

Comparing the two representations, note that in Figure 1, the binaries are depicted in terms of either/or conceptions. Society is here, self is there; reality is here, knowledge is there. Dialectics is predetermined to follow certain patterns of causality. In this vision, it is really possible to speak of “social origins of knowledge” since the two poles “society” and “knowledge” are dichotomized into separate bodies which are thought to have a reciprocal,

though predetermined, interaction with one another. The same is thought to be the case for self-society and interpretation/theory-practice dialectics. Self is said to originate in society, though is recognized to have in its development a reciprocal interaction with it. Practice determines theory, because the conceptual framework has enabled us to separate the two into distinct categories.




Figure 1

In Figure 2, however, much of the assumptions of Figure 1 are impossible to hold. Reading the conceptual framework in terms of part/whole representations, self is depicted as being a part of society, knowledge a part of social/self reality, and theory/interpretation itself a type of practical endeavor. “Social origins of knowledge,” or “social origins of self,” or “practice determines theory” seem now to be tautological statements in this alternative visual depiction. How can one seek the social origins of knowledge when knowledge itself is conceived as a social phenomenon? How can one speak of social origins of self, when self

itself is seen as a particular social relation? How can practice determine theory when theorizing and interpretations are conceptualized as modes of mental practices?

Here the oppositions are not in terms of mutually exclusive conception of self vs. society, knowledge vs. reality, or theory vs. practice but in terms of internal dialectics of part/whole entities—dialecticities which by their very nature cannot be universally predetermined since any evocation of part implies an identical and “twin-born” evocation of the whole, and vice versa. The determination of particular forms of causality




Figure 2

between these entities, in other words, is not a matter of universal ascription, but a matter and result of empirical investigation of each particular case (hence the notion of what I have called “postdetermination,” i.e., causality being only determinable *after* investigation of each case, while recognizing that the very act of our interpretation/theorization in the research process itself may transform the nature of the subject matter being investigated, because, following the part/whole analogy, the researching subject is treated as being a part of the object of research).

The ideological nature of our visualization in Figure 1 may be noted in its a priori attribution of primacy to social structural and practical constraints to self, knowledge, and interpretive processes. In other words, a certain hierarchy of causal determination is universally maintained, em-

powering one at the expense of the other pole of the binary. Needless to say, this influences not only practical policy, but also academic discourses on the subject, to the extent that particular aspects of the subjects tend to become habitually investigated rather than others. Say, an emphasis on social constraints on self behavior or knowledge pursuit finds it difficult to accommodate the biographical event of a certain literary artist, such as Octavio Paz, who at the height of his official career as Ambassador to India, suddenly, upon hearing about the massacre of Mexican university students by the Mexican government, immediately condemns it and resigns from his post. Or, that in his writings, Paz’s self-critical study of Mexican identity leads to the alienation of many close friends in official and elite Mexican society, because he has the courage to say what his literary and scholarly conscience obligates him to say.

In other words, here we have a case in which self, knowledge, and theoretically derived principles resist structural social constraints and practical benefits emanating from diplomatic posts.

A sociology of knowledge that always seeks the “social origins of knowledge,” “social origins of self,” or “practical origins of theory,” is structurally constrained not to see the “paradoxes,” or “deviances,” as manifestations of alternative norms in the making, but at best as exceptions to the norm. It is the story of the old man looking for his lost key outside the house simply because it is easier to look there under sunlight. We tend to universalize the norms embedded in the status quo, because it is easier and more evident; sun’s rotation around the earth is much easier to “notice” than the other way around. Living in a historical social formation in which the self is subservient to the “other” and the social structure, knowledge to material interests, and wisdom to practical considerations, we tend to universalize the pattern as if it is naturally preordained, not that they have been socially constructed and promoted as dominant social structural norms. Problematizing the self-society, society-knowledge, or theory-practice dialectics only in terms of a particular, historically legitimated modality of their determinations helps only to reinforce them, empower them, and thereby constrain the development of alternative selves, knowledges, and theoretical interpretations of cases where selves and knowledges do succeed in transcending their social structural and practical constraints.

In the visualization depicted in Figure 2, however, the question of whether this or that aspect of the relationship is causally primary or not is not assumed, but is sought not only through concrete empirical investigation of the subject matter, but perhaps even subjected to the interpretive and practical influence of the inquiring subject

her/himself, since in this alternative conceptual framework the knowledge of the investigator her/himself are itself treated as parts of the subject matter being investigated as a whole. Scientific objectivity is thereby attained not via separating and distancing oneself from the subject matter, but by reflexively and consciously treating one’s own biases and policy preferences as part of the subject matter to be investigated and problematized.

### III. DE/RECONSTRUCTING THE “SELF”

We are back to the “problem-with-the-problem” paradox with which I began this paper. And here again, but this time with respect to Figure 2, I need to reflectively draw attention to a problem with how I depicted the conceptual framework of our “modern” sociologies of knowledge. This observation has to do with the assumption of singularity of our selfhoods—itsself, in my view, having a lot to do with the individualistic western cultural environment in which much of our sociological and psychological conceptual frameworks are formed. The best way I can introduce this subject—as much a “deviation” from the norm, and a sociological “self-destructive” behavior this may appear to be for modern “scientific” sociological thinking—is to draw upon my studies of an eastern spiritual tradition associated with the teaching of the Middle Eastern philosopher and mystic, G. I. Gurdjieff. After all, transcendence of our dichotomized east-west traditions may turn out to be an essential component of our sought-after postmodern rethinking of the sociology of knowledge.

Time and space do not allow me to introduce the ideas and teachings of Gurdjieff in detail here; I have elsewhere (Tamdgidi 2002) extensively presented an account of my appreciative, but at the same time inde-



pendent and critical, study of Gurdjieff's thought. For our purpose here, I would like to draw attention to one of the central components of Gurdjieff's thought, namely the existential problematization of the nature of humans as "individuals," and recasting them in terms of "three-brained beings." By this Gurdjieff meant to suggest that the unity and singularity implied in the notion of "individuality," as often assumed and aspired to in the western tradition, is by no means an in-born and assumed trait, but one that can only come about as a result of effort, or of what can more specifically be termed "conscious and intentional suffering," on the part of the person her/himself. By the notion of "three-brained being" Gurdjieff sought to depict the so-called "individual" as actually a legion of "I"s gravitating towards three main physical-moving, intellectual, and emotional centers in the organism. The true "I" representing the singular will can only come about through continual efforts over lifetime in self-observation, self-remembering, and external-considering of everyday manifestation of these "I"s, their classification and interpretation in terms of the three centers, the awakening to the utter alienation and separation of these centers from one another, and the intentional efforts to be made in reblending of the respective unconscious, conscious, and subconscious modes of awareness associated with the physical, intellectual, and emotional centers respectively. The unification of the individual as a result of these efforts does not necessarily obliterate the "I"s inherited from the past, but subjects them to the willfulness of the master I, as consciously and intentionally sublimated parts of a consciously and intentionally created and maintained individual whole. The partial "I"s may continue to play what appears to be mundane and fragmented roles in the dramas of everyday "normal" life, but for the individual they are conscious and intentional performances for the purpose of more or less

strategic life goals and plans in larger world-historical and even cosmic contexts.

The value of Gurdjieff's notion of multiplicity of selves for the purpose of rethinking our modern sociologies of knowledge is to interrogate our habituated notions of society as an interactive system of assumed "individual" or groups of "individual" behaviors, and the recasting of society as a system of intra-, inter-, and extrapersonal selves. Self is not simply a thing, or even a process, but a particular social relation, a social agency relating to itself, which then develops in process and along the way crystallizes along definite but possibly transient personality traits and attributes. We are of course familiar with the usages of self in both personal and broader collective senses. But, by abandoning the assumed singularity of our individualities and approaching the individual itself as a collectivity of multiple selves—as we are accustomed to do with regards to broader selfhoods in collective settings—we open up more useful conceptual landscapes in investigating, understanding, and transforming our inner and broader social realities.

In this alternative framework, which invite what I call quantal (postmodern) rethinking of our sociologies and sociologies of knowledge, we seek to rehabilitate our social and sociological visions as systemicities of individuals in favor of systemicities of self relations within (intrapersonal) and across persons (interpersonal) and in relation to our natural and built environments (extrapersonal). This sociological imagination is quantal in three specific senses: 1-it views social reality beyond atomic individual relationalities and in favor of sub-atomic and quantal self relations; 2-it views such relationalities in terms of open-ended, creative, and unpredictable outcomes that may, in aggregate, produce alternative modes of macro social realities and structures; 3-it adopts an alternative epistemo-

logical and methodological approach to self and broader social research in terms of the *postdeterminist* dialecticities of self-society, knowledge-reality, and theory-practice.

What I mean to suggest here, by means of illustration as well as implication, is that the reason often certain social problems seem to pose a paradox for us—such as rethinking sociology while practicing existing sociologies—is because of our assumed notions of individual singularity in the social agencies we investigate. The paradox, in other words, is not really “out there,” but in the modern social and sociological visions and lenses we use to investigate our everyday and world-historical realities. The possibility of multiple self-hoods and diversely acting self agencies within and across bodies in my view calls for a deep-rooted and paradigmatic overhaul of our sociological and psychological assumptions and imaginations, necessitating overturning of what was an exception (say, dissociative or multiple personality disorders) into a common experience of everyday life in which the clinical cases supply only extreme examples of what is in fact a common human lot in the kind of historical conditions we find ourselves—unless, of course, conscious and intentional efforts are exerted towards reblending our self and broader social landscapes in favor of more integrated human architectures.

In this alternative perspective, actually, the dualism of self and society—and sociology and psychology for that matter—breaks down for ever and blends into an exercise of unity in diversity, social relations being recast as self-relations, or selves as social relationalities. Efforts in personal self-knowledge, as Octavio Paz’s work best illustrates—thanks to Capetillo’s drawing our attention to it—are seen simultaneously as exercises in world-historical endeavors in self-knowledge, and what appeared to be relationships to an “other” or a set of “others” (as in the case of Jewish/Israeli at-

titudes towards their victimizers and victims) are reconceptualized in terms of typologies of intra-, inter-, and extra-personal self relations, corresponding respectively to self-relationalities embodied in the same person, across persons, or in the relations of persons to their natural and/or built environments.

My relationship to you, then is not a relation with an “other” but a self-relation of an interpersonal kind. My relationship to my house is no longer a relationship to an “other” but an extrapersonal one relating to myself. Social relations are recast as self-relationalities of various kinds. Figure 3 illustrates how modern binaries of self and society may be recast in terms of sociality of multiple selfhoods within and in broader society. This conceptual framework allows depiction of variations in the architecture of self-structures within and across persons, whereby one can differentiate between more or less alienated or dissociated selfhoods within and across persons, and in the relation of persons with their environments. The key here is to note the definitional transcendence of the binary dualism of self and society, and therefore of sociology and psychology, in favor of one that involves postdeterminist consideration of self-society relations in terms of part-whole dialectics.

In the alternative (what I call) quantum sociological imagination where social reality is perceived at the level of chaotic, open-ended, and unpredictable relationalities of sub-individual selfhoods, the paradox of “self-destructive behavior” gives way to the conflict of selves within and across personal and collective agencies. It is no longer surprising to find healed and psychopathological selfhoods living side by side in the same person, generation, and population as a whole. It is no longer surprising to find victims and victimizers in the same personal, generational, and ethno-national landscapes. It is no longer surprising to find




Figure 3

Pazes that suffer under the burden of inherited indigenous Aztec and Spanish colonial self-destructive identities, and Pazes that creatively seek to manufacture new cultural identities, literary forms, and imaginations often in defiance of personal and professional comfort zones. The violence of class, gender, racial, ethnic identifications in terms of rigidly separable bodies becomes impossible in a quantal sociological imagination in which the exploited and exploiter, oppressed and oppressor, femininity and masculinity, whiteness and blackness, reside in the same personal and collective selfhoods. What makes self-destructive behavior possible, namely the assumption that the malady is with the whole person residing in the body, gives way to a non-dualistic, dialectical conception in which the ill and healing selves are recognized as permeating the inner landscape. Destructive behaviors, within and in broader society, feed off dualistic social conceptions and structures and originate in them. Liberation from self-destructive behavior inherently involves a move away from dualistic modern thinking and in favor of quantal part/whole conceptions of the self and "other."

The quantum sociological imagination is liberating in three fundamental senses: *First*, that the roots of the problems are sought not simply in the "others" spatially distanced in other persons and collectivities, but is sought as well in the self, for "social" relationalities are thought to be simultaneously inter- and intra-personal in nature, as in the dialectics of parts and whole; to ignore this self-reflective seeking of the root causes in oneself, as well as in the other, is to lose sight of an important source of the problem in the first place. The quantum sociological imagination invites us to not lose sight of but especially enter the labyrinths of our dark inner solitudes to seek our lost keys. *Second*, the quantum sociological imagination is liberating in that it legitimates the possibility that in the most

psychopathological and the darkest landscapes of our inner labyrinths, there can emerge alternative self-healing visions and attitudes that can take charge of clearing our inner Augean Stables. And *third*, the open-ended, creative, and unpredictable sociological imaginations cast in quantum visions will empower our selves, knowledges, and theories, to withstand in defiance the pressures of the rigid habituations and sedimentations of inherited world-historical structures and transform them in favor of utopistic horizons.

## DE/RECONSTRUCTING MODERN SOCIOLOGIES (OF KNOWLEDGE)

Moving to broader reflections on the preceding arguments, I would like to characterize Figure 1 as a typical representation of our Newtonian sociological frameworks, and Figures 2 and 3 in tandem as movements towards quantal social scientific practices. It is also possible to associate this classification of modalities of sociologies of knowledge with another typology informed by the debates on modernity and postmodernity. Let me begin with the latter set.

I think it is useful to propose a typological triad of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern sociologies of knowledge. In my view, these correspond more or less to what one may call prescientific, Newtonian-scientific, and quantum-scientific sociologies of knowledge. I am purposely including the notion of science in the triad, to suggest that for me postmodernity and science are not mutually exclusive and contradicting notions. Science, itself, is an evolving and changing historical artifact, and transition to postmodernity in my view is less a move away from science per se than from a particular formulation and practice of it. The same, I would argue with regards to the notion of modernity itself.

Concurring with Bruce Mazlish's notion of "multiple modernities,"<sup>1</sup> I think the transition is not one of moving away from modernity per se, but one from a particular mode to a new modality of it. The "post-modern," in other words, is to be interpreted as moving beyond a particular notion and practice of "modernity" in favor of new formulations and practices of it. "Modern," as Mazlish reminds us, in and of itself involves the notion and the capacity to constantly and ceaselessly renew oneself, itself implying a commitment to open criticism and self-criticism. The modern was invented—perhaps as a positive side-effect of an otherwise problematic capitalist enterprise bent on seeking ever newer and ceaseless modes of accumulation of wealth as an end in itself—as a mode of personal and social living involving openness to ceaseless change beyond constricting traditional habituations. The transition from the premodern to modern, then, is so because it is a transition from static to dynamic, self-critiquing, and self-renewing modes of thinking and living, while recognizing that the new modalities in turn may sooner or later become traditional, outdated, and in need of self-critical reflection and renewal.

The transition from modern to post-modern, however, is an open-ended process, which could involve either a retreat to the past, to static and traditional modes par excellence or a freezing in the present, in a new state of static attachment to results already achieved, or it could be a transition to newer dynamic ways of thinking and living—hence preserving the modern spirit in and of itself, but moving it into new domains and towards newer horizons. For this reason, my invitation to move towards quantum sociologies of knowledge should not be interpreted as a move away from the notion of modernity involving critical and

self-critical capacities for renewal, but to the problematization of the by-now stitized and subconsciously sedimented Newtonian structures which have hitherto informed our modes of inquiry in the subfield. Postmodernity and postmodern science are really about transcendence of particular forms of modernity and science, not about abandoning modernity and science per se. If by postmodernity is meant the abandoning of the mode of ceaseless self/critical renewal beyond ever newer habituations of life, and in that regard abandoning of science per se rather than abandoning a particular modality and practices of it, I am certain I will not be on that train. But I certainly join all efforts to move beyond the existing structures of "modernity" (in quotes) as historically specific practices in science, in sociology, and in sociologies of knowledge in particular, and in that I certainly advocate a post-"modern" vision.

From a theoretical standpoint, if premodernity and modernity are interpreted in terms of static vs. dynamic modalities, the postmodern may be seen as a transitional state, one which may end up being a retreat to static premodernities of the past or of the present or to dynamic new modernities of future. From an historical standpoint, however, as we have learned from Weber, such ideal-type formulations often take more complex and surprising turns in actual historical realities. The Newtonian mode of scientificity, in other words—even though it was itself a significant step towards modernity with respect to what preceded it—may be now a new premodernity with respect to the potential new paths science could take and somewhat has taken in understanding and changing reality. Even the perspectives now defined as postmodern, if they become arrogant of themselves and abandon their self-critical dynamism, may actually turn out to breed new forms of old modernities or, even more regressively, of premodern modes of thinking and practice. We need to

---

1. Unpublished manuscript. Here I would like to thank Professor Bruce Mazlish for sharing his work on progress with me.

also note that the typology does not necessarily imply historical linearity; in other words, it may be that a much earlier tradition, demonstrating more dynamic openness to change may have heralded a more modern and dynamic vision of nature, society, and self, than other rigidified and static views which came later. The interpretation of the typological triad, therefore, must itself be practiced dynamically in historical context, and not rigidly pre- and superimposed from without on the subject under investigation.

Moving beyond the above clarifications, we may ask, What substantively distinguishes premodern, “modern,” and postmodern sociologies in general and sociologies of knowledge in particular. In what way are they associated with pre-Newtonian, Newtonian, and quantum scientific modes of inquiry?

*Premises of the Newtonian World-view*

To be sure, the Newtonian scientific model heralded a new approach to knowing and changing the world, hence becoming one of the defining features of the “modern” culture, because it substituted for the merely speculative and mysterious conception of the universe governed by an unknowable supernatural force, a conception of it as a law-governed universe in which, given sufficient data, even the mind and purpose of God could be measured and calculated. Newton’s three laws of motion of matter were a revelation. In his own words, these laws were as follows:

FIRST LAW: Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by a force impressed on it.

SECOND LAW: The change in motion is proportional to the motive

force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.

THIRD LAW: To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction; or, the mutual actions of two bodies are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.

To compare, let me quote here two popularized versions of the first law, randomly drawn from two different educational website on the internet:

Law 1 - An object moving in a straight line will continue moving in a straight line, unless acted on by an outside force. Also, an object at rest will stay at rest. The word for this is inertia. ([http://www.ed-helper.com/ReadingComprehension\\_27\\_20.html](http://www.ed-helper.com/ReadingComprehension_27_20.html))

.....

I. Every object in a state of uniform motion tends to remain in that state of motion unless an external force is applied to it. (<http://csep10.phys.utk.edu/astr161/lect/history/newton3laws.html>)

The reason I am quoting the different versions of the first law is to highlight a chief characteristic of the Newtonian world-view contained in them, namely, the so-called “billiard-ball game” conception of the universe, in which bodies act upon one another from “outside,” “externally.” Interesting to note here, and that’s why I am quoting other versions for comparison, is that in Newton’s own words, the externality of impression of force is not necessarily implied—though he almost certainly meant it to be interpreted as such. The notion “impressed on it,” in other words,

leaves it open whether the object *itself* could impress a force upon itself, as one of the possibilities. But Newton apparently did not mean it as such, and that is why he was accordingly interpreted to convey the notion of force as externally impressed on the object. The Newtonian conception, in other words, implied a universe structured as bodies, very large to very small, whose motions are law-governed by forces they externally exert on one another. This view, we should note in passing, still accommodates Newton's religious world-view, since the ultimate "external" force may still be conceived to be that exerted by God. God and his Spirit or Will is thus posed as an externality to matter in such a cosmology. Below, on the human scale of things, the same may be accommodated in terms of the externality of mind versus matter.

We need not go much further than examination of these laws to remind ourselves of the basic structure of the Newtonian world-view and science, and to be able to observe the identity of this cosmology with the particular Newtonian model of the sociology of knowledge as visually depicted in Figure 1. Bodies, large or small, relate to one another as external entities in precisely determinable and predictable law-governed relationships whose structure can be discovered and analyzed through studying the nature of forces they exert on one another from without. We humans may not know exactly these forces in very large or very small scales, and may therefore have to resort to various statistical tools of measuring their probabilistic outcomes, but this does not mean that these forces are in and of themselves indeterminable, unpredictable, and chaotic. The order of the universe, from God's nature above to the movement of smallest particles of matter below, is precise, determined, and potentially knowable. This, of course, was a revolution in the prescientific cosmologies preceding Newton, for it made it possible to move beyond mysteries and specula-

tions about nature, motivating generations of scientists to seek the truth in actual facts of existence. The power of the Newtonian science was so immense, and its force so powerful, that even the genius that was Einstein, despite his newfound conception of the universe based on the theories of general and special relativity, could not abandon Newton's ultimate vision of universe as an ordered medium. "God does not play dice," Einstein said when dismissing the new arguments that were being advanced by the emerging quantum physicists in favor of a vision advocating a less determinable and predictable, ultimately a "chaotic," universe. Einstein, like Newton perhaps, was intensely eager to discover and read the mind of God to provide the ultimate explanation for the nature of the universe, and by extension, ourselves.

### *Promises of the Quantum Scientific Vision*

Paradoxically, in recent decades quantum physics has increasingly drawn a picture of the universe of subatomic particles as chaotic, indeterminable, unpredictable, and open-ended. While the Newtonian laws still hold for the motion of large objects, at the subatomic levels investigations have found Newtonian laws inoperative for quantal objects. It appears that such objects have a "mind of their own," their behavior not following the "law-governed" expectations of Newtonian dicta. Beneath the apparent order lies another subatomic structure of quantal bodies behaving in what appear to be "strange" and "unconventional" ways. The vision of a mechanical universe has thereby given way to one governed at its roots by chaos. On the quantal level, dichotomization and rigid classification seems to be next to impossible. The either/or logical argumentations give way in quantum science to the fuzzy

logic of and/both, objects being recast as processes and relationalities with fuzzy boundaries, intertwined with other objects, involving multiple identities, directionalities, and diverse and unpredictable outcomes.

The new sciences of physics and cosmology are, of course, hard at work in solving this puzzle of all time, to reconcile the orderly laws of the very large, with the chaotic and strange behavior of quantal objects. Postmodern science is therefore, as noted above, a transitional state, having already questioned and moved beyond the “modern” Newtonian vision of the universe, increasingly developing new methods, techniques, and theories about how the quantal universe operates. This dualism of macro and micro visions, however, not having arrived at a unitary theory of universe, renders potentials for both progress and regression.

An important question that arises from the postmodern debates in science, in my view, is the plausibility of multiple visions of universe, and the appreciation of the value each may hold for further advancement of science. The universe, in other words, can be alternatively viewed as a system of cosmoses, a system of galaxy clusters, a system of galaxies, a system of stars, a system of “solar” systems, a system of atomic elements, or a system of subatomic, quantal entities. Do these alternative ways of viewing the universe have equal value for the kind of visions and theories we may develop about the “behavior” of their respective elements? A vision of a solar system, for instance, provides a much different sense of orderliness than a microscopic vision of a human brain system, or a theoretical consideration in the mental space of behavior of quantal objects, let alone the behavior of those objects “in themselves”—problematizing of course whether such a dichotomy between mind and matter can be assumed at the quantal level in the first place. What

difference does it make to view the universe as a system of law-governed billiard balls vs. a system of strangely and unpredictably behaving quantal objects?

How should one reconcile the quantum vision of the universe with the orderly cosmologies of Newton or even Einstein? Are they mutually exclusive visions and interpretations of the universe? Are modern and postmodern scientificities associated with Newtonian and quantum physics irreconcilable with one another? And what difference does it make to reorient our sociological imaginations and sociologies of knowledge from Newtonian to quantum modalities? Are there, parallel to alternative visions of the universe as reviewed above, alternative visions of society whose value for self and social knowledge and change may prove to be in variance with one another?

### *Newtonian and Quantal Sociological Imaginations*

The long-standing uneasy divide between micro and macro sociological theories in fact echoes in parallel the divide between Newtonian and quantal scientific visions of the universe today. The micro social theories associated with symbolic interaction and phenomenological sociology, for instance, emphasize the plasticity of human nature, the creative, indeterminacy, and unpredictability of human behavior in everyday life. At the very least, they begin with such assumptions. The macro theories associated with the conflict, functionalist, and some rational choice theories, on the other hand, take as their assumptions the determinate nature of human behavior in the web of larger social structures constituting them.

It is puzzling to note the degree to which the basic definitional structures of society, sociology, and the sociology of knowledge, are still cast in Newtonian mo-



dalities. Take the very commonsense definition of society and therefore of sociology that we use and teach in our textbooks. Here is the definition of sociology offered by the American Sociological Association:

Sociology is the study of social life, social change, and the social causes and consequences of human behavior. Sociologists investigate the structure of groups, organizations, and societies, and how people interact within these contexts. Since all human behavior is social, the subject matter of sociology ranges from the intimate family to the hostile mob; from organized crime to religious cults; from the divisions of race, gender and social class to the shared beliefs of a common culture; and from the sociology of work to the sociology of sports. In fact, few fields have such broad scope and relevance for research, theory, and application of knowledge. (ASA website)

Noteworthy here is that the subject matter of sociology, namely society or social life, is conceived of as one involving interactions of “people” in groups, small or large, and how those interactions shape their behavior, or vice versa. The Newtonian objects in this vision, in other words, are the individuals embedded in diverse sets of collective networks or systems, their external interactions with one another in diverse social contexts said to be the determinants of and/or products of their behavior. The “social,” in other words, is defined in terms of interpersonal relationalities *between* people only, that is, interpersonally, and not also as systemicities of sub-individual self elements that constitute those persons within and without—the totality of such self-relations within and across persons and towards the natural or built environments (in the latter case, say, the

“promised land” or “Mexico”) extrapersonally.

The behaviorist views of individual behavior as being shaped by external social stimuli, as we know of course, were long challenged by Mead, Cooley, Goffman, and other symbolic interactionists, who emphasized the independent self-interactive voices and roles individuals play in social interactions. Weber had already told us it is not sufficient just to study the external interactions of individuals in social life, but to seek to understand the subjective meanings they attributed to their actions. What to a behaviorist may appear to be the same action by different individuals, may actually be actions taken for completely different motives and ends when studied through a symbolic interactionist perspective. It is true that according to Mead, self is a “social” product and cannot arise without a social context—“social” being interpreted as relationships to other individuals, groups, and collectivities. It is actually due to the capacity for making and using symbols, Mead and symbolic interactionists argue, that we owe the origins of our selfhoods. However, Mead also argued that once the self arises in the individual, it takes a life of its own, and its development through various play and game stages and phases of socialization takes place not according to a simple outside-in modality, but as a dialectical process through which the self itself participates. There is no assumed initial temporal state where we could ascribe a “primary” status to an “other” vs. our selves. Selves, once constructed are legitimate agencies of behavior and action. That is what Mead and other pragmatists emphasized by using the term “twin-born.”

Mead argued that the formation of self is by no means uniform and the same for individuals subjected to the same social milieu, and that there was no guarantee that the multiplicity of self-identities internal-

ized as a result of interaction and performance of social roles in diverse settings end up becoming articulated in a uniform and singular self-structure. He actually recognized multiplicity of selves as a common and normal occurrence. He did not, of course, argue, that all such states lead to extreme conditions of disorder found in some clinical situations, but the recognition of the fragmented and divided nature of what we otherwise assume to be an "individual" and singular entity gives much credence to the argument that the assumption of singularity of individuals taken as basic units of social life and sociological analysis is by no means to be held. The Newtonian "billiard balls" of society, and of sociology, in other words, do have not only a mind, but often distinctly *multiple* minds, of their own. There is a sub-"atomic," sub-individual, social universe of social reality to be reckoned with on its own terms and scale.

Goffman's dramaturgical theory sheds much light on not only the possibility but the reality of multiple self-hoods shaping everyday social lives. In Goffman's conceptual landscape it is possible to be one self in the back stage, but play out various other self roles in diverse social situations. Goffman's dramaturgical theory of life as a social drama, in which human actors take up various roles, and construct distinct selves for the conduct of public life, interestingly complements Gurdjieff's notion of the fragmented nature of the individual self-hood. Recognizing that beneath the apparently unified and singular individuals lie chaotic landscapes of multiple self-hoods and personalities, more or less separated and alienated from one another, and occupying diversely unique self-structures, the key question is what should really be taken as a unit of analysis of social behavior and action. Are individuals or their collectivities agencies of action, or are these agencies various sub-individual selves constituting their often fragmented and divided landscapes within and in broader society?

The movement from Newtonian to quantum science involved the recognition of an underlying structure of matter that contained but was not reducible to the larger systems previously taken for granted as constituting matter. As we raised the question earlier, here, with respect to society and sociology as the study of it, we can raise the question, Is society to be viewed as a system of interacting persons in collective settings, small or large, or is society a system of underlying quantal selves whose strange, unpredictable, open-ended, and creative behaviors are potential sources of alternative social knowledges and structures, rather than reverse being assumed to be the case? Only the nourishment of self-determining quantal selfhoods can provide the necessary conditions for taking courageous Pazian actions to revisit our world-historical demons within and without, and to resist and prevent the continuation or breeding of old or new forms of dreadful Holocausts.

Much of our existing "modern" sociological theories in fact lend useful hands to the building of alternative quantum sociological imaginations. The complexity of contradictory social behaviors and actions are more effectively captured in a sociological imagination that takes multiple self-hoods of acting historical agencies as an assumption rather than considering them only in exceptional clinical situations. Exercising this sociological imagination, it becomes less paradoxical to note that the same person uses existing frameworks of sociology of knowledge while seeking to rethink and apply in new ways alternative frameworks; it becomes less paradoxical to consider healed and pathological selves living together in the same person or groups of Holocaust survivors, descendents, or fellow citizens; it becomes less paradoxical to see the rhetoric and policies of anti-terrorism coupled with terrorizing and/or terror-generative policies. The same alternative conceptual structure also make us more ap-

preciative of successful and creative literary efforts, such as that accomplished by Octavio Paz, to revisit the mythological, cultural, and colonial self-hoods chaotically internalized in the texture of our intra-, inter-, and extra-personal selfhoods, and reblend them in critical ways to transcend such “social origins” by establishing globally envisioned new identities for ourselves as persons, ethnic-national communities, and more broadly as human species.

Interrogating anew our self-hoods within, with our adversaries, and with respect to our so-called natural rights to land, heritage, and nature, we may begin to find value not only in the social origins of our knowledges, but also in alternative intellectual, emotional, and physical social arrangements that cherish our shared interests as human species rather than our narrow ethno-national self-identities.

## CONCLUSION

When Movahedi discovers and reports (1994) that both the multilingual analyst and analysand resort to multiple languages to communicate with one another in the course of therapy depending on whether earlier or later life experiences are evoked, this only enriches a vision of the therapeutic interaction beyond a dualistic and in favor of a collective dialogue within and across multiple selfhoods—a dialogue that must necessarily recognize that the healer and the healing selves are themselves multiple and that they do not necessarily always sit face to face. Or, the disengaged, abstract, or intimate suicide notes found among militants intending to perform military missions (Movahedi 1999) may be reinterpreted as expressions of efforts on the part of various physical/mundane, intellectual/ideological, and emotional selves preparing the body as a whole in the temporal progress towards their missions,

whether or not each self actually left its corresponding note for the purpose. That a single suicide note was left by or found for each person does not necessarily mean that the person as a whole wrote it, but that a particular self wrote it depending on the timespace in and the purpose for which it was written. Similar multiplicity of mundane concerns, ideological voices, and intimate feelings may have been present in each person intending to commit the act, they were just not equally expressed as such in writing. Nutch’s solo “intra-active” research among marine scientists at work is also an exercise in “interactive ethnography,” because self-interaction is as real and consequential as interactions across persons—and this would still be a perfectly Meadian perspective to hold. Holocaust survivors can be both healed and wounded, Israelis and Arabs both victimized and victimizers. It will take Pazian efforts to confront the chaotic and painful realities of our inner conflicts to forge new social existences out of our critical knowledges of ourselves within and in the broader global society.

To rethink sociology, or the sociology of knowledge, along postmodern directions and beyond, involves openness to overhaul our cherished definitional frameworks in sociology, and more specifically in the sociology of knowledge. It calls for revolutions in our social psychologies and social psychiatries. By rethinking them, I don’t think we move away from our sociologies, sociologies of knowledge, and our sociological careers; we actually come closer to forging new visions to understand and transform our social realities in favor of building more harmonious social and built environments across persons and cultures. The quantum sociological imagination provides a more fruitful conceptual landscape for the study and resolution of self-destructive behaviors in larger world-historical settings, for it erases the dualistic social conceptions and structures which make them possible and

necessary. It allows us to equally emphasize the liberating powers of our selves, knowledges, and theories.

What I have termed the sociology of self-knowledge is another expression for the exercise of our quantum sociological imaginations, stretched on the micro level to the most inner private recesses of our intrapersonal social realities, and on the macro level to the global and world-historical landscapes which have shaped and are shaped by our personal and private social encounters without and within. It is this concern with the dialecticity of personal and world-historical spacetimes that defines the central agenda of *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, a student-centered forum that provides an avenue for the exploration of personal self-knowledges within a re-imagined sociological framework. The journal seeks to creatively institutionalize new conceptual and curricular structures of knowledge whereby critical study of one's selves within an increasingly world-historical framework is given educational and pedagogical legitimacy. The journal may be a quantal exercise in the academic solar system of conventional sociologies and sociologies of knowledge. However, only a simultaneously sub-atomic and cosmic sociological imagination can recognize its value in the midst of the strangely creative and energetic objects gathering in the cold, predictable, and rigid Newtonian confines of a campus classroom:

*According to G. I. Gurdjieff's theory of "three-brained" human beings, the development of the fully completed "I" hinges on the development of the other three parts of the self; the physical, the emotional, and the intellectual centers. Gurdjieff states, "The fundamental evil among contemporary people is that, owing to the rooted and widespread abnormal methods of education of the rising generation, this fourth*

*personality, which should be present in everybody on reaching responsible age, is entirely lacking in them" ("From the Author" in Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson, G.I Gurdjieff, 1092-1093). I could not reconcile my own intellectual perceptions with my emotional ones. I quote a juror in the film Twelve Angry Men, "Facts, you can twist them anyway you want to." I saw this twisting of my self-identity throughout my education and I couldn't integrate my symbolic self. As Gurdjieff explains, we are constituted of three parts, struggling to achieve the harmonious four part person, the completed "I." He likens this disjointed self to a carriage in which the "coachman" is the intellectual self, the "horse" the emotional self, the "box" the physical self, and the "passenger" the master self representing the complete "I." My "coachman" kept taking free breaks from school, my "horse" plodded in every distracted direction, my "box" was soaked in drinking, and my "passenger" was simply not there. The master self had checked out of the body already—the symbolic self-interaction was simply not happening. ...*

*Growing is both a joy and a frightening adventure. I just wish that my mother was alive to see me today. I know that she had the same struggles in developing her personal life and that she had succeeded in finding herself. I take her strength as mine and pray to her that somehow she is with me on my journey. I still fear my feelings and writing a paper like this helps me face and express those fears. Marge Piercy has a poem entitled, "Unlearning To Not Speak." In it, she states, "She must learn again to speak. Starting with I." This is I: I have found my own way to live. I have to be true to myself. In order to truly grow, I must keep my-*

*self in perspective with my own world, with myself, and my sojourn as my priority. I've sprung myself from all the iron cages that had once imprisoned me. I'm flying now. And I can't wait to find out where I will land.*

(Annie Roper, Soc. 341-01: Elements of Sociological Theory, Fall 2003, UMass Boston; in *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, Vol. II, No. 2, Fall 2003/Spring 2004)

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Butcher, Dick and Frank Nutch. (1999). "Reflections on Doing Interactive Ethnography," *The Discourse of Sociological Practice*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall, 10-14.
- Capetillo, Jorge. (2004). "Deciphering the Labyrinth." Abstract for paper presented to the Eastern Sociological Society, February 2004. (see the present issue for full text of article.)
- Ginach, Michal. (2004). "Is it a War against Terrorism or a War for Terrorism? Is There An Underlying Fantasy Behind The Israeli Pattern Of Encounter With Palestinians?" Abstract for paper presented to the Eastern Sociological Society, February 2004. (see the present issue for full text of article.)
- Goffman, Erving. (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Doubleday.
- Gomolin, Robin. (2004). "'Sick' or 'Not-Sick,'" Is That a Personal Fantasy or an Ideological Question?" Abstract for paper presented to the Eastern Sociological Society, February 2004. (see the present issue for full text of article.)
- Gulbenkian Commission. (1996). *Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Gurdjieff, G. I. (1950). *All and Everything: Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson*. First Edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Mannheim, Karl. (1936). *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. Harcourt & Brace.
- Mead, George Herbert. (1934). *Mind, Self and Society*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- Mills, C. Wright. (1959). *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mazlish, Bruce. "Multiple Modernities" (unpublished manuscript).
- Movahedi, Siamak. (1996). "Metalinguistic Analysis of Therapeutic Discourse," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*. 44.3: 837-862.
- Movahedi, Siamak. (1999). "The Utopian Pursuit of Death," *American Imago*, Volume 56, No. 1, Spring., 1-26.
- Movahedi, Siamak. (2003). "Notes from the Editor," *The Discourse of Sociological Practice*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring, p. 4.
- Nutch, Frank. (2003). "In The Field: Reflections on Selected Aspects of Sociological Fieldwork," *The Discourse of Sociological Practice*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring, 15-19.
- Roper, Annie. (2003/4). "Marx, Gurdjieff, and Mannheim: Contested Utopistics of Self and Society in a World-History Context," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, Vol. II, No. 2, (forthcoming).
- Speeth, Kathleen Riordan. (1989). *The Gurdjieff Work*. NY: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Perigee.
- Tamdgidi, Mohammad H. (1999). "Ideology and Utopia in Mannheim: Towards the Sociology of Self Knowledge." Presented at the History of Sociology Refereed Roundtable Session of the American Sociological Association, 94th Annual Meeting, August 6-10 1999, Chicago. (Sociological Abstracts, ASA Supplement 186, p. 107, accession number: 99S38555).
- Tamdgidi, Mohammad-Hosseini. (2002). "Mysticism and Utopia: Towards the Sociology of Self-Knowledge and Human Architecture (A Study in Marx, Gurdjieff, and Mannheim)." Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton.